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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we explore the argument that one of the causes for the limited 
growth effects of trade openness in Africa may be the weakness of institutions. 
We also control for several major factors and, in particular, for export 
diversification, using a newly developed dataset on Africa. Results from Arellano-
Bond GMM estimations on panel data from African countries show that 
institutions play an important role in enhancing the growth effects of trade. 
Moreover, we find that the joint effect of institutions and trade has a U-shape, 
suggesting that as openness to trade reaches high levels, institutions play a critical 
role in harnessing the trade-led engine of growth. The results from this paper are 
informative about the missing link between trade liberalization and growth in the 
case of African countries. 
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1. Introduction 
African countries have implemented a series of economic reforms, including trade 
liberalization, with the aim of boosting economic growth. The theoretical motivation for 
these reforms is that trade liberalization is expected to increase trade, which in turn raises 
the rate of economic growth. However, the empirical evidence from the large and 
growing literature on trade and growth remains mixed (Edwards 1998; Rodriguez and 
Rodrik 2001; Baliamoune 2002; Yanikaya 2003). Some studies suggest that trade 
liberalization is not associated with growth while others conclude that trade openness 
may even retard growth. For example, while Sachs and Warner (1997) argue that trade 
openness increases the speed of convergence, the evidence from the study by Baliamoune 
(2002) suggests that increased openness to trade has led to income divergence rather than 
convergence in African countries. In fact, Rodrik (2001) argues that, regarding trade 
openness and growth, “the only systematic relationship is that countries dismantle trade 
restrictions as they get richer.”  
 
This paper contributes to this debate on the linkages between trade liberalization and 
growth in the case of African countries. The paper specifically explores the argument that 
one of the causes for the limited growth effects of trade liberalization may be the 
weakness of institutions. Indeed one strand of the literature on growth has argued for the 
primacy of institutions in economic development (Easterly and Levine 2003; Dollar and 
Kraay 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004). Of particular relevance for this study is the finding from 
empirical studies that institutions are crucial for the success of economic reforms in 
developing countries (Acemoglu et al. 2003; Dollar and Kraay 2003; Addison and 
Baliamoune-Lutz 2006). This evidence suggests that the failure of trade reforms to 
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promote trade and growth in African countries may be attributable to the poor quality of 
institutions. The results from the study by Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2006) on 
North African countries show that the growth effects of economic reforms depend to a 
large extent on the quality of institutions.  
 
This paper examines whether this finding can be generalized to all African countries. The 
paper estimates a growth model including measures of institutional quality and indicators 
of openness in addition to conventional correlates of growth. We also control for the 
effects of other major factors of growth. In particular, we control for the effects of export 
diversification, using a newly developed data set on African countries (Ben Hammouda 
et al 2006). The empirical analysis uses Arellano-Bond panel estimation techniques to 
uncover joint effects of trade liberalization and institutional quality on growth in African 
countries while controlling for potential bias due to endogeneity of some regressors 
including the lagged dependent variable.  
 
The results from this paper are informative about the missing link between trade 
liberalization and growth in the case of African countries. The evidence indicates that, 
once we control for other factors, institutions have a robust and positive impact on 
growth. More importantly, institutions play an important role in enhancing the 
effectiveness of trade liberalization. These effects of institutions are non-monotonic and 
exhibit a U-shape pattern: at low levels of trade openness, the joint effect of institutions 
and trade liberalization on growth is negative. As trade openness reaches higher levels, 
better institutions appear to enhance the growth effects of openness. The results also 
confirm the role of other important factors of growth, especially positive effects of 
domestic investment and negative effects of ethnic fractionalization and economic 
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instability proxied by exchange rate variability. The results with the measure of 
concentration and diversification of exports are consistent with the recent history of the 
continent where oil-producers have dominated in terms of growth performance.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review 
of the empirical literature on trade liberalization and growth, as well as the role of 
institutions with an emphasis on evidence on African countries. Section 3 describes the 
empirical methodology and the data, and discusses the estimation results. Concluding 
remarks are provided in Section 4. 
 
2. Growth, trade, and institutions: a brief literature review 
 
Standard theory predicts that trade liberalization should promote trade, which in turn 
fuels growth in the long run. Theory suggests that trade liberalization expands trade 
opportunities, improves efficiency of allocation of resources (towards the most efficient 
sectors), and accelerates technological development especially through liberalization of 
imports. It is expected that high-technology imports enhance domestic innovation, thus 
raising productivity and growth. 
 
However, after decades of liberalization experiments in Africa and in developing 
countries in general, the evidence on the growth effects of trade liberalization remains 
mixed (Greenaway et al. 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; Dollar and Kraay 2003; Rodrik 
et al. 2004). Various arguments have been advanced to explain the limited effects of trade 
liberalization on growth. In this review we only stress some of the possible reasons for 
the weak empirical evidence on the growth effects of trade openness.  
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From a methodological standpoint, the observed weak link between trade liberalization 
and growth may be attributed to measurement imperfections: the indicators used in 
empirical analysis may not capture the true essence of openness. Indeed, due to lack of 
data on indicators of trade openness as a policy, empirical studies (as this one does) resort 
to measures of trade outcomes, i.e., trade volume, as proxies for trade openness. It is 
assumed that positive trade outcomes are an indication of a policy environment that is at 
least not anti-trade. Moreover, a high trade volume indicates exposure to international 
markets with the associated benefits (e.g., technological transfer), which openness 
policies seek to achieve. Thus, to some extent trade outcomes do carry some indication of 
the effects of trade liberalization. Nonetheless, results from analyses using trade volume 
as a measure of trade openness have to be interpreted cautiously. Indeed, variations in the 
volume of trade do not always reflect actual government policies that promote or hinder 
trade. For instance, fluctuations in commodity prices result in changes in trade flows even 
in the absence of shifts in trade policy.  
 
The weak empirical evidence on the link between trade liberalization and growth can also 
be due to problems of misspecification. In particular, the effects of trade liberalization 
may materialize only with a lag. In the short run, liberalization may have negative effects, 
especially by undermining domestic production because of competitive imports, retarding 
growth (Mukhopadhyay 1999). Hence, to the extent that these negative short-run effects 
and the expected delayed positive effects occur consecutively, growth would exhibit a 
J-curve type of response to trade openness (Greenaway et al. 2002). Therefore, empirical 
studies may yield inconclusive and even misleading results if these dynamic and 
counterbalancing effects are not fully taken into account. 
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Another explanation relates to the structure of trade. Whether a country benefits from 
trade liberalization or not in terms of growth depends on the composition of trade. 
Mazumdar (1996) hypothesized that the composition of trade determines the strength of 
the “engine of growth.” Indeed, Lewer and Van Den Berg (2003) find evidence 
supporting the view that countries that import capital goods and export consumer goods 
grow faster than those that export capital goods. The evidence suggests that African 
countries and developing countries in general would benefit from trade most by 
promoting exports of labor-intensive goods and services while encouraging imports of 
capital goods (Lopez 1991). This implies that the current export boom which is driven by 
capital-intensive sectors such as oil is not likely to generate growth that is sustainable, 
especially because of the low gains in employment creation and limited spillover effects 
on non-oil sectors. 
 
To gain from trade liberalization, a country must have adequate industrial strategy that 
fosters economic diversification.1 The failure of trade liberalization to promote trade 
expansion is partly attributable to the lack of effective national industrial policies to 
enhance diversification of the production and export base. The narrow export base has 
exposed African countries to the vagaries of international markets, resulting in high 
volatility of export proceeds and exchange rate instability (Bleaney and Greenaway 
2001). Indeed, economic vulnerability has been shown to be one of the major factors that 
have prevented African countries from achieving high growth rates on the one hand, and 
sustaining high growth rates on the other (UNECA 2006; Fosu 2001; Guillaumont et al. 
1999). 
                                                 
1 See Ben Hammouda et al. (2006) for detailed discussion of diversification regimes and trends in African 
countries. 
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The weak effects of trade liberalization on growth may thus be due to insufficient focus 
by policy makers on factors that make liberalization work. Unless accompanying policies 
are implemented to provide an environment that is conducive for trade, investment, 
productivity, and private sector activity in general, the effects of trade liberalization will 
be only marginal (UNCTAD 2005). The lack of effective accompanying policies to trade 
liberalization may explain weak growth gains from liberalization in various ways. In 
particular, due to ineffective investment promotion policies, the gains from trade 
expansion are not translated into economic diversification and growth. Moreover, 
inefficient management of foreign reserves may also prevent countries from benefiting 
from trade expansion. Indeed, foreign exchange proceeds are often stored into idle 
reserves instead of being absorbed into the economy and invested into productive 
activities. While African oil-exporting countries have experienced substantial trade 
account surpluses and high saving rates, this has not translated into commensurate 
increases in investment in non-oil sectors (UNECA 2006). This raises concerns about the 
sustainability of oil-led growth. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of African financial 
systems, which are characterized by pervasive inefficiencies in financial intermediation 
may also explain weak transmission from trade liberalization to growth. Indeed, even 
when countries experience expansion in trade, the resulting increases in savings do not 
stimulate investment due to inefficient financial intermediation.  
 
Therefore, it appears that the broader institutional environment is key to the transmission 
from trade liberalization and trade expansion to growth. This suggests that weak 
institutions and an inadequate economic policy framework may be partially responsible 
for the weak growth gains from trade liberalization in African countries. However, the 
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empirical literature has thus far been unable to establish a robust role of institutions in the 
linkage between trade and trade liberalization on the one hand, and trade liberalization 
and growth on the other. Dollar and Kraay (2003) suggest that growth regressions 
including both institutions and trade may yield insignificant results for both trade and 
institutions due to the high correlation between the two determinants of growth. By 
taking into account this relationship, Dollar and Kraay (2003) find a significant joint 
effect of trade and institutions on growth in the long run but a larger role of trade alone 
on growth in the short run. This suggests that good institutions are critical for the ability 
of a country to generate long-run growth gains from trade liberalization. The results 
suggest that the weak growth benefits from trade liberalization in African countries may 
be due to inefficient institutions. This paper explores this hypothesis further while also 
paying attention to other non-institutional factors of growth. 
 
3. Empirical analysis: methodology, data, and estimation results 
3.1 Model specification and estimation methodology 
We use panel data from 39 African countries covering the period 1975-2001. However, 
data are not available for the same period of time for all countries, thus the panel is 
unbalanced. The model to be estimated is the following: 
yit= αyit-1 + βxit-1 + γzit + νi + εit 
Where yit is the natural logarithm of per-capita real income in country i at time t, xit is a 
vector of predetermined and endogenous variables, zit is a vector of exogenous variables, 
and α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated. We assume that νi and εit are independent 
over all time periods and for each country i. The term νi represents country-specific 
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random effects which are independent and identically distributed over the countries, and 
εit is also independent and identically distributed.  
 
We estimate the model using Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). Tests for autocorrelation and the validity of 
instruments (Sargan test) are presented along with the coefficient estimates in Tables 2-5. 
The variables used in the empirical estimations are described in the next subsection.  
 
3.2 Description of the data 
The list of the countries included in the sample is given in Appendix A. The countries are 
selected based on data availability. We use data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators for income per-capita, openness (defined as the sum of exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP, in log), domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP (log), total reserves (log), credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (log), 
and adult literacy as a measure of human capital. Our measure of institutional quality is 
the Polity 2 variable from the Polity IV project. This variable is measured on a –10 to 10 
scale, with higher values indicating better institutions. We also include data on indicators 
(indices) of export concentration (the ogive index) and diversification (the entropy index) 
from a newly developed dataset (Ben Hammouda et al. 2006). The first indicator, called 
the ogive index, measures the extent of export concentration, with higher values 
indicating higher concentration (lower diversification). The second indicator, called the 
entropy index, measures the extent of diversification in exports, with higher value 
implying higher diversification. Details on how these indices are calculated are given in 
Appendix B. We include dummy variables for Northern Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia) and Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, 
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Swaziland and Zimbabwe) to account for the fact that these subregions comprise more 
advanced economies, especially in terms of financial development and economic 
diversification. Information on ‘ethnic tensions’ is only available for the period 1982-
1997. Thus regressions including this variable cover a shorter time span. Descriptive 
statistics for selected variables and periods are reported in Table 1. 
 
We include domestic investment and human capital (proxied by literacy), which have 
been proved to be robust determinants of growth. Both variables are treated as 
endogenous. We provide a discussion of the rationale for the inclusion of the other 
variables in the next two paragraphs. 
 
In many developing countries, export proceeds have not been well intermediated in the 
financial system. An underdeveloped financial system is unable to absorb sizeable 
foreign exchange inflows and minimize exchange rate instability. Furthermore, it is 
unable to allocate the resources into the most profitable activities. We therefore need to 
control for the role of financial development by including an indicator of financial 
development into the growth equation. This is beyond the fact that financial development 
has been demonstrated to affect long-run growth. We use domestic bank credit to the 
private sector as a measure of financial development. Given the possibility of two-way 
causation between growth and finance, the indicator of financial development is treated 
as endogenous.  
 
High volatility of exports can retard growth through exchange rate instability. We control 
for this effect by adding an indicator of real exchange rate instability, measured as the 
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annual deviation (in absolute value) of the real exchange rate index from a time trend. 
This variable is treated as exogenous. 
 
Export booms (and aid inflows) have allowed many countries to accumulate substantial 
amounts of reserves. This is particularly evident for oil-rich countries during episodes of 
high oil prices. Excessive accumulation of reserves, however, may not help growth – they 
are sterile resources. We control for this effect by including reserves in the growth 
equation. We use the logarithm of total reserves (including gold). We treat this variable 
as exogenous. 
 
The measures of export concentration and diversification are included in the model to 
explore whether, as theory predicts, diversification of exports (which indicates 
diversification of production) is associated with higher and more sustained growth. It is 
expected that a more diversified economy is able to withstand shocks to production and 
exports and thus minimize volatility of growth. We test this prediction in the case of 
African countries. 
 
Finally, the model includes an indicator of ethnic fractionalization. We use the variable 
‘ethnic tensions’ from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database as a 
measure of ethnic fractionalization. This variable is measured on a 0-6 scale, with higher 
values implying lower ethnic tension. Ethnic tensions tend to be high in countries with 
high fractionalization. Several studies have shown that ethnic fractionalization or ethnic 
heterogeneity has a negative effect on growth. The effect could arise through the effects 
of ethnic tensions on private investment and public expenditure on education and health 
(Mauro 1995, Easterly and Levine 1997), or through increased incidence (and the 
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probability) of internal armed conflicts which destroy economic activity (Collier and 
Hoefler 1998, Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz 2004). It has been shown that the effect of 
ethnic fractionalization may be nonlinear (Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz 2004). Thus, 
we consider a quadratic specification of the linkage between ethnic tensions and growth. 
The data on ethnic tensions start in 1982 and end in 1997.  The variable ‘ethnic tensions’ 
is treated as predetermined. 
 
3.3 Discussion of the results 
We use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation technique with income per-capita (in log) as 
the dependent variable. We treat the variables ‘literacy’, ‘institutional quality’ and 
‘openness to international trade’ (and their interactions) as endogenous. In all regressions, 
the results of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions are in support of the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  
 
Four sets of regression results are presented in Tables 2-5. Table 2 contains regression 
results for the full sample period 1970-2001 and the data from 39 countries, excluding the 
measure of ethnic fractionalization which is reported on a shorter time period, 1982-1997. 
Table 3 presents results including the measure of ethnic fractionalization. Table 4 
contains results for the regressions exploring joint and threshold effects of the interaction 
between trade and institutions on the one hand, and trade and financial development on 
the other hand. Finally, Table 5 displays results from estimations including, in addition to 
the variables in Table 4, alternatively a measure of export concentration (Ogive index – 
columns 1-2) and a measure of export diversification (entropy index – columns 3-4). 
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In this section we highlight the key findings from the empirical analysis. First, trade 
openness has a positive and significant effect on economic growth only when we do not 
include ethnic tensions (Table 2), and/or interactions between trade and other relevant 
factors (as in Tables 3-5).  Second, the results in Tables 4 and 5 clearly indicate that the 
joint effect of trade and institutions on growth is positive and robustly significant. The 
joint effects of trade and institutions on growth are non-monotonic and exhibit a U shape: 
when trade openness increases, good quality institutions enhance the growth engine of 
trade. This is because the good economic governance associated with high quality 
institutions translates into good strategies to manage export revenues and channel them in 
productive activities, which promotes growth. Third, the impact of institutions (the Polity 
2 variable) is positive and fairly robust, once we account for the interaction between 
institutions and trade. 
 
Table 5 displays the estimates including indicators of export concentration and 
diversification. In equations 1 and 2 we use the Ogive index (measure of concentration), 
while in equations 3 and 4 we use the Entropy index (measure of diversification). Recall 
that a high value of the Ogive index indicates higher concentration, while a higher value 
of the Entropy index indicates higher diversification. The results obtained with both 
measures are consistent. They show that, contrary to expectations, high concentration 
(low diversification) actually has a positive effect on growth in Africa. However this 
seems to be a correct illustration of the reality in Africa where countries which are least 
diversified have grown faster. In particular, oil-rich economies have grown faster than 
non-oil economies (Figure 1).2 This was most evident in the past few years due to oil 
price hikes.  In 2005-06, African oil economies as group grew by 6.1% compared to 4.9% 
                                                 
2 Table A2 in Appendix A gives the distribution of African countries by resource endowment. 
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for non-oil economies. Oil economies have posted double digit growth rates frequently, 
especially following discovery of oil or of new reserves or influx of FDI in the sector. In 
contrast, endowment in minerals does not seem to have given any edge in terms of 
growth (Figure 2). Thus, the association of export concentration and high growth in 
Africa is mainly an oil story, but not a mineral resource story.  
 
In addition, the interaction between openness and concentration (Ogive index) has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient (equation 2 in Table 5). The negative sign 
on the interaction between the export concentration index and openness to trade can be 
interpreted as the inability to sustain high growth led by resource booms. This is also 
consistent with the reality of very volatile growth in the continent. Alternatively, the 
positive sign of the interaction between the Entropy index and openness may suggest that 
in more open economies, diversification enhances the growth effects of increased 
openness. Diversification allows a country to sustain higher growth by increasing its 
resilience to shocks due to, among others, the vagaries of international commodity 
markets and weather changes. 
 
It is worth noting that including measures of concentration did not alter the robust results 
in Table 4. In addition, now we have strong statistical evidence that landlockedness has a 
negative effect on growth, and total reserves have a positive impact. The latter result 
implies that African countries in general have not experienced negative growth effects of 
reserve accumulation and that the reserves accumulated may have been used to minimize 
risk, especially by protecting the exchange rate against shocks. 
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Three conclusions from the results are worth emphasizing. First, the results suggest that a 
country needs to reach a certain threshold of trade openness before it can reap the 
benefits of the growth-enhancing joint effects of institutions and trade openness. At high 
levels of trade, the quality of institutions plays a key role in the transmission of trade 
gains into growth. One possible explanation is that as trade increases, opportunities for 
embezzlement and other wasteful uses of resources increase, with damaging effects on 
growth. Good institutions are critical for channeling the proceeds from trade expansion 
into growth-enhancing activities, including investment. Moreover, good institutions are 
essential for managing trade booms to minimize economic instability. 
 
The second conclusion is that poor quality of institutions prevents countries from reaping 
the benefits from trade booms. While trade booms may produce short-run growth, the 
ability of a country to sustain high growth is contingent upon the quality of its 
institutions. The evidence implies that poor quality of institutions may be one of the 
reasons for the failure of African countries to capitalize on trade gains associated with 
commodity export booms. 
 
Third, the results confirm the advantage enjoyed by African economies in terms of 
growth as illustrated by the positive association between export concentration and real 
GDP growth. However, the results also indicate that export concentration will ultimately 
hurt growth as trade increases while diversification helps the country to sustain growth. 
 
The regression results also confirm the role of factors which have been proved to be 
fundamental determinants of growth in the empirical literature. In particular, the results 
indicate that investment is positively and significantly related to growth. Exchange rate 
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instability undermines growth, an indication that economic instability is one of the 
reasons for slow growth among African countries. The variable ‘ethnic tensions’ seems to 
have an inverted-U relationship with income. Since ICRG assigns a higher value for 
lower tension (lower fractionalization), the results imply that as fractionalization (ethnic 
tension) decreases from very high levels (very low ICRG score) to medium levels, the 
impact on income (growth) is positive. However, as the score improves and ethnic 
tensions move to very low levels the impact on income becomes negative. This is not 
surprising; for example, Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2004) find that there is a U-
shape relationship between ethnic heterogeneity (where higher values indicate higher 
heterogeneity) and the success of peace-building. The variable ‘ethnic tensions’ has also 
been used in the literature to represent ethnic polarization (Keefer and Knack 1998). 
Thus, the results derived in this paper suggest that there is a level of polarization at which 
the positive effect on income is maximized and above which further decline in ethnic 
fractionalization could have a negative effect on growth.  
 
Two regression results appear to be counterintuitive and deserve some explanation. The 
measure of human capital, literacy, has an insignificant coefficient, which implies that 
human capital (as measured here) has not played a significant role in growth in Africa. 
This is at odd with the evidence from the endogenous growth literature that identifies 
human capital as an important driver of long-run growth. However, in the case of African 
countries, the result could simply be an illustration of the fact that growth, which has 
been largely resource-led (especially oil), has often occurred in countries with very low 
levels of human capital. These countries have failed to invest adequate resources in 
building human capital through education. The lack of a significant positive relationship 
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between literacy and growth  should be interpreted as reflecting this artifact of cross-
country distribution of growth and literacy in African countries. 
 
The result for financial development also needs some explanation. In most estimations, 
financial development is shown to be negatively related to growth, but its interaction with 
trade openness has a positive coefficient. However, regressions with a quadratic 
specification show that at high levels of trade, the joint effects of trade and financial 
development on growth are negative, which is contrary to expectations. This result could 
be an illustration of the fact that countries that have experienced trade booms in Africa 
tend to have low levels of financial development. Note that the inclusion of dummies for 
Southern Africa and North Africa, the two subregions with the most financially 
developed countries, reinforces this artifact. Therefore, the result should not be 
interpreted as a causal relationship but as a simple correlation illustrating the fact that 
financial development is low in many countries that have experienced trade-led growth.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the questions of whether trade openness contributes to 
higher income and whether institutions influence the growth effects of trade. The 
empirical results indicate that, once we control for other factors, institutions have a robust 
and positive impact on growth. More importantly, institutions play an important role in 
the growth effectiveness of trade liberalization. However, the joint growth effect of 
institutions and trade has a U-shaped form. As trade openness reaches higher levels, 
improved institutional quality enhances the growth effects of trade. Export concentration 
has a positive direct effect on growth, which we interpret as a reasonable illustration of 
the oil-led growth observed in Africa in recent years. However, export diversification is 
 17
shown to enhance the growth effects of trade openness. We also find strong evidence 
supporting the role of other important factors of growth, especially the positive effects of 
domestic investment and negative effects of ethnic tensions, instability (as proxied by 
exchange rate variability) and landlockedness. 
 
The evidence in this paper supports the view that one of the causes for the limited growth 
effects of trade liberalization may be the weakness of institutions. The empirical results 
suggest that institutions have an important influence on the effectiveness of trade policy 
(assuming that trade policy is strongly correlated with the volume of trade). This is 
consistent with the findings from empirical studies that conclude that institutions are 
crucial for the success of economic reforms in developing countries.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
 Mean Standard dev Min Max Count 
Income (PPP)      
1975-79 954.93 956.29 224.80 5111.50 170 
1980-84 1322.01 1261.98 321.36 6607.50 187 
1985-89 1681.42 1530.20 335.63 8026.40 199 
1990-94 1928.40 1825.78 405.78 8279.40 208 
1995-2001 2252.29 2252.29 448.00 11290.00 294 
Openness      
1975-79 65.30 31.49 16.95 162.45 176 
1980-84 65.99 35.04 6.32 178.99 189 
1985-89 62.90 33.06 12.96 163.66 198 
1990-94 67.32 33.89 15.20 172.18 208 
1995-2001 71.65 33.84 20.82 181.77 299 
Adult literacy      
1975-79 35.95 18.30 6.70 75.60 195 
1980-84 40.95 18.79 7.90 78.40 195 
1985-89 46.07 19.15 9.60 80.80 195 
1990-94 51.26 19.19 11.40 84.00 195 
1995-2001 57.18 19.07 13.50 89.34 273 
Ethnic tension      
1982-84 2.88 1.24 1 5 66 
1985-89 3.03 0.98 0.6 6 160 
1990-94 2.97 1.20 0 6 165 
1995-1997 3.84 1.19 0 6 97 
Polity      
1975-79 -5.34 5.08 -10.00 9.00 204 
1980-84 -4.99 5.31 -10.00 10.00 205 
1985-89 -5.92 7.54 -10.00 10.00 205 
1990-94 -2.25 5.82 -10.00 10.00 212 
1995-2001 -0.12 5.31 -9.00 10.00 301 
Ogive index      
1980-84 62.67 43.48 7.54 208.11 180 
1985-89 69.97 52.98 2.15 212.84 180 
1990-94 81.17 59.24 9.96 221.50 179 
1995-2001 75.14 56.90 6.05 236.25 259 
Entropy index      
1980-84 2.91 1.19 0.29 8.9 180 
1985-89 2.75 1.33 0.13 6.82 180 
1990-94 2.67 1.38 0.35 5.19 179 
1995-2001 3.09 2.17 0.05 16.75 259 
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Table 2:  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation (excluding ethnic fractionalization) 
                       Dependent variable: Income (per-capita income, in log) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Income (lagged) 0.677*** 
(0.037) 
0.6442*** 
(0.037) 
0.640*** 
(0.037) 
Endogenous variables   
Literacy  -0.099* 
(0.043) 
0.028 
(0.049) 
0.046 
(0.051) 
Openness 0.037 
(0.014)* 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
Investment 0.056*** 
(0.010) 
0.054*** 
(0.010) 
0.055*** 
(0.010) 
FinDev -0.008 
(0.008) 
0.052 
(0.037) 
0.051 
(0.037) 
Inst. Quality (Polity) 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
FinDev x Openness  -0.0158 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
Exogenous variables   
Initial income  -0.0011 
(0.0009) 
-0.004*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.005*** 
(0.0012) 
Total Reserves  0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
Exchange rate  instability -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Landlocked 0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.0018 
(0.001) 
Northern Africa  0.0027 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Southern Africa  0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.0117*** 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
    
Number of obs. 741 741 741 
Wald test-chi2    2110.91 
 
2204.24 2211.95 
 
Sargan testa, chi2  
[prob>chi2] 
783.80 [0.99] 788.39 [0.68] 787.72 [0.68] 
M2b, z ; [pr > z] 1.86 [0.06] 1.90 [0.057] 1.92 [0.055] 
 
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)  
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
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 Table 3:  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation (including ethnic fractionalization) 
 
Dependent variable: Income (per-capita income, in log) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Income (lagged) 0.7164*** 
(0.029) 
0.6885*** 
(0.032) 
0.6916*** 
(0.032) 
Endogenous variables   
Literacy  -0.034 
(0.061) 
0.039 
(0.067) 
0.0440 
(0.067) 
Openness -0.008 
(0.0132) 
-0.0058 
(0.013) 
0.051** 
(0.022) 
Investment 0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
FinDev -0.092 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
0.079*** 
(0.030) 
Inst. Quality (Polity) -0.0001 
(0.0007) 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
FinDev x Openness   -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
Ethnic tensions 0.034** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.014) 
0.038*** 
(0.013) 
Ethnic tensions2 -0.0051*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.002) 
Exogenous variables   
Initial income  -0.0025** 
(0.001) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.002) 
Total Reserves  0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
Exchange rate  instability -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.004) 
Landlocked -0.0002 
(0.0013) 
 -0.003* 
(0.001) 
Northern Africa  0.0023 
(0.0026) 
0.0029 
(0.0026) 
Southern Africa  0.0087** 
(0.003) 
0.0114*** 
(0.003) 
Constant 0.0261*** 
(0.008) 
0.0435*** 
(0.011) 
0.0485*** 
(0.011) 
Number of obs. 366 366 366 
Wald test-chi2    1309.58 1345.26 1366.47 
Sargan testa, chi2  
[prob>chi2] 
432.70 [0.99] 436.49 [0.39] 431.10 [0.92] 
M2b, z ; [pr > z] -0.36 [0.72] -0.34[0.73] -0.51 [0.61] 
 
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)  
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
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Table 4:  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation (including interaction between trade and institutions) 
Dependent variable: Income (per-capita income, in log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (lagged) 0.6355*** 
(0.037) 
0.6346*** 
(0.037) 
0.6952*** 
(0.032) 
0.6670*** 
(0.032) 
Endogenous variables    
Literacy  0.052 
(0.051) 
0.053 
(0.051) 
0.056 
(0.068) 
0.064 
(0.067) 
Openness 0.020 
(0.030) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
0.007 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
Investment 0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
FinDev 0.005 
(0.039) 
-0.0028 
(0.090) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.170** 
(0.068) 
Inst. Quality (Polity) 0.089*** 
(0.023) 
0.087*** 
(0.024) 
0.078*** 
(0.021) 
0.056** 
(0.021) 
Inst. Quality x Openness -0.045*** 
(0.013) 
-0.044*** 
(0.012) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
Inst. Quality x Openness2 0.0057*** 
(0.001) 
0.0056*** 
(0.001) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0037** 
(0.0014) 
FinDev x Openness -0.0044 
(0.010) 
0.0130 
(0.043) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
0.104*** 
(0.035) 
FinDev x Openness2  -0.0022 
(0.005) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Ethnic tensions   0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.0498*** 
(0.013) 
Ethnic tensions2   -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Exogenous variables    
Initial income  -0.0052*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0017) 
Exch. rate instability -0.0117*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0182*** 
(0.004) 
-0.182*** 
(0.004) 
Landlocked -0.0017 
(0.0012) 
-0.0017 
(0.0012) 
-0.0026 
(0.0017) 
-0.0027* 
(0.0016) 
Total Reserves  0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0005 
Northern Africa 0.0026 
(0.0022) 
0.0026 
(0.0022) 
0.0019 
(0.0027) 
0.0036 
(0.0027) 
Southern Africa 0.0108*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0024) 
0.010*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0038) 
Constant 0.035*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
0.052*** 
(0.0116) 
Number of obs. 741 741 366 366 
Wald test-chi2    2273.99 2270.67 1384.95 1455.92 
Sargan testa, chi2  
[prob>chi2] 
779.55 [0.91] 778.18 [0.99] 418.71[0.99] 425.32 [0.99] 
M2b, z ; [pr > z] 1.58 [0.11] 1.58 [0.11] -0.54 [0.59] -0.60 [0.55] 
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)  
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
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     Table 5:  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation (including export diversification/concentration indices) 
Dependent variable: Income (per-capita income, inlog) 
 (1) with 
concentration 
(Ogive) index 
(2) with 
concentration 
(Ogive) index 
(3) with 
diversification 
(Entropy) index 
(4) with 
diversification 
(Entropy) index 
Income (lagged) 0.6654*** 
(0.034) 
0.6690*** 
(0.034) 
0.6755*** 
(0.034) 
0.6760*** 
(0.0340 
Endogenous variables    
Literacy  0.046 
(0.067) 
0.045 
(0.067) 
0.046 
(0.067) 
0.039 
(0.067) 
Openness 0.029 
(0.025) 
0.068** 
(0.030) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
0.0034 
(0.031) 
Investment  0.041*** 
(0.012) 
0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.026*** 
(0.012) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
FinDev -0.209*** 
(0.073) 
-0.141* 
(0.078) 
-0.203*** 
(0.073) 
-0.161** 
(0.077) 
Inst. Quality (Polity) 0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.041* 
(0.022) 
0.048** 
(0.022) 
0.043* 
(0.022) 
Inst. Quality x Openness -0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
Inst. Quality x Openness2 0.0029** 
(0.001) 
0.0026* 
(0.001) 
0.0030** 
(0.001) 
0.0027* 
(0.001) 
FinDev x Openness 0.132***  
(0.039) 
0.098** 
(0.041) 
0.127*** 
(0.039) 
0.108*** 
(0.040) 
FinDev x Openness2 -0.0208*** 
(0.005) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0202*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0183*** 
(0.005) 
Ogive or Entropy index  0 .00025*** 
(0.00008) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0061** 
(0.0023) 
-0.058* 
(0.031) 
Ogive or Entropy index 
 x Openness 
 -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0129 
(0.007)* 
Ethnic tensions 0.458*** 
(0.014) 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.045*** 
(0.014) 
Ethnic tensions2 -0.0066*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.002) 
Exogenous variables    
Initial income  -0.0089*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0019) 
Exch. rate instability -0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
Landlocked -0.0042** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0044*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0044** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0044** 
(0.0017) 
Total Reserves  0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
Northern Africa 0.0064** 
(0.002) 
0.0053* 
(0.002) 
0.0047* 
(0.0026) 
0.0041 
(0.0026) 
Southern Africa 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.0181*** 
(0.003) 
0.0185*** 
(0.004) 
0.0177*** 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.062*** 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.012) 
0.064*** 
(0.012) 
0.063*** 
(0.013) 
Number of obs. 332 332 332 332 
Wald test-chi2    1313.80 1320.77 1306.56 1308.43 
Sargan testa, chi2 [prob>chi2] 402.30 [0.99] 396.90 [0.99] 403.78 [0.99] 400.73 [0.99] 
M2b, z ; [pr > z] 0.24 [0.81] 0.30 [0.76] 0.33 [0.74] 0.28 [0.78] 
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a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid) 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
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Figure 1: Real GDP growth for oil vs. non-oil economies, 1980-2006 (% per annum) 
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Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit 
(online database).  
 
Figure 2: Real GDP growth for mineral-rich vs. non-mineral non-oil African countries, 
1980-2006 (% per annum) 
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Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit 
(online database).  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.  List of countries 
Algeria Congo, Rep. Mali Senegal 
Benina Egypt Mauritiusa Sudan 
Burkina Faso Eritreaa Malawi Swazilanda 
Botswana Ethiopia Morocco Tanzania 
Burundia Gambia Mozambique Togo 
Central African Rep. Ghana Mauritaniaa Tunisia 
Cameroon Guinea Bissau Namibia Uganda 
Democratic Rep. of Congoa Kenya Niger Zambia 
Chada Lesothoa Nigeria Zimbabwe 
Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar South Africa  
 
a Data on ethnic tensions in these countries are not available. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Classification of African countries (included in this study) by resource 
endowment (oil and minerals) 
 
Oil-rich countries Mineral non-oil Non-mineral non-oil 
Algeria, Cameroon, 
Chad, Congo Rep., Côte 
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Tunisia 
Botswana, Central African Republic, 
Congo DR, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Guinea Bissau, Gambia, 
Kenya, Lesotho,  
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Morocco,  
Senegal, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Concentration and diversification indices 
Various measures of diversification and concentration of exports have been used in the 
literature (see Ali et al. 1991 and Ben Hammouda et al. 2006). In this paper we use two 
of these measures: the Ogive index which measures export concentration and the Entropy 
index which measures export diversification. The Ogive index is computed as follows: 
∑= −= Ni i NNPindexOgive 1
2
/1
)/1(_  
The Enropy index is computed as follows: 
 
)/1(log_ 21 i
N
i i
pPindexEntropy ∑==  
 
In these formulas, N represents the total number of export commodities in the export 
portfolio (so 1/N  represents the mean export share for each commodity) and Pi  
represents the actual share of the ith commodity in total exports.  
The lowest possible value of the Ogive index, which is zero, occurs when the share of 
export is distributed equally among commodities. Thus, higher values of the Ogive index 
imply higher concentration (or lower diversification). The maximum value of the Entropy 
index occurs when all the Pi are equal. This implies maximum diversification as all 
commodities in the export portfolio have identical share. Thus, higher values of the 
Entropy index imply higher diversification (or lower concentration). 
 
 
